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DANILEVSKY, Nikolai Yakovlevich (1822–1885)—Russian political writer, natural scientist, ideologist of late Slavophilism. *Russia and Europe* (1869), the main book by Danilevsky, responded to the general political and international challenges of the time and represented an attempt to solve the problem of the historical role of Russia and the Slavs. Danilevsky denied the reality of “humanity” as a single entity; he admitted that only separate “cultural and historical entities” (equal in a way to biological species) participate in the historical process. Under cultural and historical entities he meant separate nations with their original civilizations and cultures, which cannot be transferred or adopted. Danilevsky considered the development of these entities to be analogous to those of living organisms (birth, growth, maturity, death).

Danilevsky believed that historical development was accompanied by the interchange of cultural and historical entities. He distinguished ten entities close to the end of their development, the Europeans being the youngest of them. According to Danilevsky, the Slavic entity, represented mostly by Russians, had just entered its prime. This entity confronts the European one. Danilevsky validated the need for Slavic political unity, supporting thus the Pan-Slavist political program.

A.G. Ganzha

DEEP ECOLOGY is a psychological approach to environmental ethics. Through a process of enlightenment or “awakening,” one recognizes one’s ecological connectedness to the biosphere. In gaining this insight, the deep ecologist squarely repudiates the human-centered (anthropocentric) orientation of the Western (Occidental) tradition.

Due to the immense popularity of this approach, particularly in the United States, Australia, and Europe, deep ecology is difficult to characterize precisely. Connections have been made between deep ecology and ecological science, Christianity, Eastern religions, ecological feminism, New Age mysticism, the forewarnings

of Aldo Leopold and Rachel Carson, the poetry of Robinson Jeffers, the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza and Martin Heidegger, and more. To avoid the complications of trying to characterize deep ecology through a general survey of its advocates, it is most efficacious to simply focus on the philosophy of the original deep ecologist, Norwegian Arne Naess, and two well-known American partisans, Bill Devall and George Sessions.

Naess is a philosopher and naturalist who coined the term in his 1973 journal article, “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary.” Though Naess conveys a humble, nonconfrontational, Gandhi-influenced demeanor, he lambastes Western civilization for arrogant human-centeredness and a related instrumentalization and subjugation of nonhuman nature by contrasting his new “deep” environmental ethic with “shallow” (or, to put it less pejoratively, “reform”) environmentalism. Shallow environmentalism is simply an extension of the anthropocentric Western paradigm, because the reasons for preserving wilderness or biodiversity are inevitably couched in terms of human welfare. Shallow environmentalism falls short of valuing nonhumans apart from their use-value. Deep ecology, in contrast, asserts that all organisms have *intrinsic* value. In this way deep ecology is fundamentally nonanthropocentric.

Two interrelated underpinnings support deep ecology’s nonanthropocentrism. The first principle, “biocentric equality,” asserts that all biota have *equal* intrinsic value. The second principle, “expansionary holism,” asserts that by a process of “self-realization” one comes to the understanding that the biosphere does not consist of metaphysically discrete individuals, but ontologically-interconnected individuals comprising one unbroken whole. Thus deep ecology is an *egalitarian* and *holistic* environmental philosophy.

Biocentric equality is the view that all biota have equal intrinsic value (or, to put it another way, it denies differential valuation among living things). In this sense deep ecology is not merely nonanthropocentric, but *anti-*

anthropocentric; in terms of moral considerability, human beings have absolutely no priority over nonhumans. Naess, Devall, and Sessions have all affirmed this way of thinking. In the words of Naess, "the equal right to live and blossom is an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom." In the words of Devall and Sessions, "all organisms and entities in the ecosphere, as parts of the interrelated whole, are equal in intrinsic worth." Clearly the target of biocentric equality is Western anthropocentrism. Deep ecologists contend that organisms have equal intrinsic value, with the implication that no form of life (namely, *Homo sapiens*) carries more weight in adjudicating conflicts of interests.

The second underpinning of deep ecology's nonanthropocentrism is expansionary holism. Some deep ecologists (notably, Devall, Sessions, and Fox) elaborate Leopold's holism by arguing for a breakdown of the ontological boundaries between self and other. This breakdown is achieved through the process of self-realization. As Fox says, "It is the idea that we can make no firm ontological divide in reality between the human and the non-human realms... to the extent that we perceive boundaries, we fall short of deep ecological consciousness." The ontological boundaries of the self are extended outward, including more and more of the lifeworld in the self. Thus, this particular formulation of metaphysical holism can be correctly thought of as "expansionary" holism. Accordingly, there is in reality only one big Self, the lifeworld.

When ontological boundaries are overcome, one realizes nature's interests are one's own interests. Devall and Sessions believe that "if we harm the rest of Nature then we are harming ourselves. There are no boundaries and everything is interrelated." John Seed, an Australian environmental activist, nicely illustrates this attitude: "I am protecting the rain forest; develops into 'I am part of the rain forest protecting myself.' I am that part of the rain forest recently emerged into thinking... the change is a spiritual one, thinking like a mountain, sometimes referred to as 'deep ecology.'" Since the rain forest is part of him, he has the moral obligation to look after its welfare. The rain forest's well-being is indistinguishable from his well-being, so its needs become Seed's needs.

These two principles have been criticized by environmental philosophers for being vague and even incompatible. David Rothenberg, however, has pointed out that a vague yet original idea like deep ecology may have more influence by stimulating new ways of thinking than a precisely delineated system. By this criterion, deep ecology has been enormously successful.

The contribution of deep ecology to environmental philosophy is the recognition that nonhumans have intrinsic value. Deep ecologists are right to excoriate the Modern Western view of nature that views organisms as biomaachines. From this standpoint, the only value fauna,

flora, fungi, protista, prokaryotae and inanimate matter have is instrumental value for humankind. So, the more natural resources are used by humans, the more value nature has. (See *Western Environmentalism*.) The importance of deep ecology is the rejection of this instrumental view of nature and the realization that nonhumans have value above and beyond use-value for humans.

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D.R. Keller

DEEP ECOLOGY, philosophy of. Deep ecology is one of the major philosophical branches in the Western environmental movement during the second half of the 20th century. Deep ecology calls for profound changes in social consciousness, which can be accomplished based on a new and original metaphysics, epistemology, and cosmology, as well as on individual and planetary environmental ethics. The uniqueness and revolutionary strength of deep ecology derive from its credible and substantial critique of the paradigms dominating developed countries. Deep ecology is rooted in several factors, among which are: the fact that ecology has developed into a new unique science; the compatibility of economic activities with the natural environment in Native American societies; Eastern and Native American spiritual and religious traditions; the ethics of Spinoza; the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and Alfred North Whitehead; and the high abstraction in contemporary fundamental sciences. The term "deep ecology" was invented in 1973 by Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess in opposition to a "shallow" reformist ecological mentality preoccupied with practical benefits. Californian sociologist Bill Devall and philosopher George Sessions used this term in critique of the anthropocentric foundation of Western civilization. According to them, Western civilization gradually degrades and needs a new philosophy, metaphysics, ethics, psychology, and science. In 1990, Australian philosopher Warwick Fox united deep ecology and transpersonal psychology in his search for the methods of personal identification of a human with the non-human world and of expansion beyond the limits of the atomized ego. Australian philosopher Freya Mathews continued this research in her study of the principles of interdependence, intrinsic values, and the self-actualization of systems. Productive research in the area of deep

6. Creation of ecologically clean materials, manufactured products, machines, and technologies;

7. Working out methods of engineering-ecological preventive maintenance, advance planning of nature protection actions, and restoration and complex reconstruction of anthropogenic landscapes;

8. Introduction of economic methods of efficient control of nature protection activity at all stages of the manufacturing of industrial or construction products, etc.

The listed directions are complex in their character and based on the research strictly adequate to the specificity of a concrete ecosystem. It is necessary to speed up consolidation of all scientific, engineering-technical and industrial forces on a uniform methodological basis in the direction of nature protection and reduction of ecological risk to the Earth.

The main goal of engineering ecology is overcoming ecological antagonism in the system "person—nature."

Implementation of concepts of engineering ecology is the system of engineering-ecological maintenance of production (SEEMP). SEEMP is a complex of the interconnected cooperating elements (subsystems) functioning in optimum management modes. Here management in the engineering-ecological sense is understood as a system of constant control and purposeful influence on conditions and factors effecting the ecological situation of the natural-technical geosystem with the purpose of the establishment, maintenance, and support of the necessary level of environmental safety during designing, production (including construction), and operation of artificial objects. SEEMP functions in the development of the following subsystems: scientific-methodological maintenance (general principles of making decisions, normative regulations, optimization of SEEMP management criteria, etc.); design maintenance (working out of calculated models and structures, designing of ecologically clean objects, etc.); technological maintenance (ways and means of ecologically rational usage of constructive decision-technological processes, regulating-technological schedule of ecological restoration of natural-technical geosystems, etc.); organizational-methodical maintenance (optimum organizational-methodical structures of production, principles of maintenance of ecological efficiency of production, ecologically optimum forms of organization of labor processes, etc.); complex ecological control (ecological examination of scientific-methodical, design and organizational-technological decisions, industrial *ecometry*, monitoring, etc.); informational maintenance (principle of accumulation, transfer, storage, and usage of ecological information, criteria of information quality and parameters of its productivity); quantitative estimation and forecasting (methodology of objective estimation of ecological situations in regional and planetary scale, multilevel identification, engineer-

ing-technological aspects of limit forecasts, etc.); optimum management (substantiation of allowable limits of regulation of labor processes and management of natural-technical geosystems, social-methodological aspects of formation of ecological knowledge and culture of labor collectives, general principles of ecologically optimum management, etc.).

Engineering ecology creates the necessary conditions for the mobilization of all actions for the protection of nature in the sphere of material-technical production and formulates technical decisions on the maintenance of true environmental safety on Earth. See also *Social Ecology*.

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I.I. Mazour

ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY is a complex branch of knowledge about the psychological aspects of the interaction between human beings and their geographical, social, or cultural environment. The environment is a part of human activities; it is an important factor in the regulation of human behavior and social interaction. Environmental psychology unites psychology with ecology and studies many social and humanitarian problems concerning interactions between human beings and their environment. This branch of psychology is based on studies in psychological aspects of architecture, industry, habitat, etc. Environmental psychology has collected some important factual material, but so far it has no theoretical structure. This research field is very topical with regard to attempts to find effective ways to overcome the ecological crisis. Environmental psychology is focused on the following issues:

1) The study of ecological consciousness through understanding human perception of the environment and its negative aspects;

2) The study of the motivation for ecological behavior, when people destroy or maintain their environment;

3) The analysis of the psychological consequences of ecological crises (mental deviations, crimes, demographic changes);

4) The elaboration of psychological methods of propaganda in order to form ecologically adequate world-views; ecological expertise in new scientific and technical projects.

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O.Ye. Baksanskiy

ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM is the inequitable exposure to pollution based on socioeconomic status. In the United States, sources of pollution such as toxic waste dumps, incinerators, manufacturing plants, and other facilities are typically located in lower income neighborhoods

(often African American and Latino) because poorer communities do not have the political and legal clout that wealthy communities do. In a report to the California Waste Management Board by a private consulting firm, the authors observe, "All socioeconomic groupings tend to resent the nearby siting of major [toxic waste] facilities, but middle and upper socioeconomic strata possess better resources to effectuate their opposition. Middle and higher socioeconomic strata neighborhoods should not fall within the one-mile and five-mile radius of the proposed site." Conversely, environmental justice is the equitable distribution of pollution regardless of social class or race. In the United States, the legal foundation of environmental justice is the Civil Rights Act of 1964, specifically Title VI: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."

There is significant evidence of distributive inequities of pollution according to socioeconomic status. Citing a *National Law Journal* report, sociologist Robert Bullard points out that penalties levied against hazardous waste sites in predominantly white areas are 500 percent higher than penalties levied against hazardous waste sites in minority communities. Moreover, abandoned hazardous waste sites in minority areas take 20 times longer to be placed on the National Priority List Superfund clean-up program than do those in white areas. In Chicago, 92 percent of the city's approximately one million African Americans live in racially segregated areas. One segregated area, the Altgeld Gardens, is encircled by municipal and hazardous waste landfills, toxic waste incinerators, smelters, steel mills, and other polluting industries. Between the 1920s and the 1970s, the city of Houston placed all of its landfills and 6 of its 8 incinerators in African American neighborhoods. The most polluted zip code in the United States (90058) is sandwiched between overwhelmingly non-white southcentral and eastern Los Angeles neighborhoods. Similar patterns persist nation-wide.

There are at least three possible justifications for the inequitable distribution of pollution point sources. (1) According to a Utilitarian viewpoint, the greatest good may be effectuated by subjecting select communities to inordinate amounts of pollution. The problem with this argument is the oft-cited criticism that public policy based solely on Utilitarian criteria opens the door for the discrimination of select individuals and/or groups. (2) From a Libertarian perspective, individuals and corporations should be able to do with their private property as they wish, including the opening of toxic waste facilities. The problem with this argument is that ecological systems do not conform to property lines. (3) Pundits of laissez-faire Capitalism argue that the market should oper-

ate unfettered by governmental intrusion, particularly laws protecting communities from pollution. The problem with this argument is that unmitigated market forces result in unethical social practices, for example, prostitution, human trafficking, drug trafficking, bribery, collusion, the formation of monopolies, and so on. There is no reason to believe that issues of health and the environment are immune. These three arguments typically used to justify environmental inequity are flawed on their own grounds. An alternative conception of justice that lays the ethical foundation for concluding that environmental inequity is unjust is the work of American philosopher John Rawls. In his landmark treatise *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls argues that a just society is one in which the least well off still live in the most favorable conditions possible and that discrepancies between the best-off and worst-off are only justified if the least well-off benefit from those social inequities. On the Rawlsian model, environmental injustice occurs when some persons are exposed to pollution and industrial toxins from which they do not benefit. Environmental justice is the distribution of pollution and industrial toxins in such a way that the living conditions of those most exposed are better off than they would be without the presence of industry.

Despite contentions that inequities regarding the distribution of pollution are justified, there is growing consensus amongst environmentalists and civil rights activists in the United States that some sort of environmental injustice or environmental racism exists. This is a result of a series of events beginning in the early 1980s. In 1982, the largely African American community of Warren County, North Carolina, fought a polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) disposal site. In 1984, a leak in a Bhopal, India Union Carbide plant killed 4000 people, and consequently residents of Kanawha Valley, West Virginia, questioned Union Carbide officials about the safety of the plant located there and discovered that Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) officials were stonewalling efforts to investigate community health concerns. (Since this area is predominantly white, issues of environmental injustice are not always strictly issues of race, but more properly of socioeconomic status.) In 1990, the EPA began to consider the issue of environmental injustice. In 1993, building on the foundation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress passed the Environmental Justice Act, the Environmental Equal Rights Act, and the Environmental Health Equity Information Act. In 1994, President Clinton signed an executive order titled Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations.

Since the issue of environmental justice arose only within the last decades of the 20th century, the question arises: why has the mainstream environmental movement not addressed the issue of environmental racism sooner? Part of the answer is that in the United States,

academic environmental ethics has tended to be holistic (that is, focusing on whole ecological systems rather than individuals) and nonanthropocentric (that is, not human-centered). Moreover, environmentalism as a political force has its roots in affluent white citizens aiming to preserve wilderness, if only for the reason of setting aside recreational space. Mainstream environmentalism has also been institutional, that is, focusing on lobbying rather than grass-roots activism.

Interestingly, the Civil Rights Movement in many ways has had opposite emphases: it has focused on individual rights and liberties, been human-centered, and found its political strength in the grass-roots. The early Warren County environmental justice activists, for example, were people seasoned in the Civil Rights Movement. During the 1990s, environmentalists became acutely aware of the problem of environmental racism and found common ground with civil rights activists, as evidenced by the 1993 roundtable discussion on race, justice, and the environment published by the Sierra Club. This cooperation between mainstream environmental and civil rights groups has taken the forms of technical advice, expert testimony, financial assistance, research, fundraising, and legal advice. Thus, for a growing number of civil rights and environmental activists, in order to take the issue of civil rights seriously, the problem of environmental racism and injustice cannot be overlooked.

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D.R. Keller

EPISTEMOLOGY. The term "epistemology" has its roots in two Greek terms, *episteme*, which means "knowledge," and *logos*, which means "discourse" or "account." Epistemology is, thus, a discourse about knowledge or an account of knowledge.

Knowledge is a true account of something. That is to say, the expression "true knowledge" is redundant, since knowledge is, by its very nature, true. Knowledge is contrasted with, on the one hand, beliefs or opinions, which may be true or false, and on the other hand, with ignorance, which is the lack of any awareness whatsoever of that about which there may be true or false opinions or about which there may be knowledge.

Discourse about knowledge includes discourse about what constitutes knowledge. Examples of what constitutes knowledge might include but not be limited to such things as simple propositions, propositions with justifications, discursive accounts, intuitions, or comprehensive systems. Discourse about knowledge also includes discourse about the condition that obtains in the knower when there is knowledge, how the knower acquires knowledge, and what counts as an object of knowledge. Regarding these matters, there is a wide range of differing accounts.

The principal ground of differentiation of epistemological positions is metaphysical. Epistemologies significantly differ in respect of what is held to be the object of knowledge. If the object is empirical (a set of experienced objects or the physical world, for example), then what constitutes knowledge will be true accounts of empirical objects, perhaps entailing their relations, causes, laws, and principles. The condition of the knower would be having some sort of awareness of the empirical objects; and the acquisition of knowledge would be, at least in part, through sense experience of those objects. If the object of knowledge is non-empirical (for example, standards, values, principles, archetypes, exemplars, laws, and essences), then what constitutes knowledge would be true accounts of these objects, their relationships and causality. The condition of the knower would be one of directing attention to these objects; acquiring knowledge would be through, in some sense, coming to an awareness of these objects.

Notice, then, that an epistemology, by its very nature, entails a metaphysics (a view on what there is and on the sorts of relationship that obtain among the things that are, including the relationships between knower and known). Notice also that there cannot be a sharp division between what one might call "empiricistic" epistemology and what one might call "non-empiricistic" epistemology. Empirical knowledge entails more than mere awareness of empirical objects. Empirical knowledge entails relations among things, causes, laws, an account of the (possibly) non-empirical knower, and an account of the relationship between the knower and the known. Acquisition of this sort of knowledge is arrived at, at least in part, by those operations of the mind by which one notes similarities and differences, generalizes in respect of those similarities and differences, analyzes, synthesizes, deduces, apprehends trends, notices structures, notices order, postulates causes, and generates rules. The non-empiricistic epistemologist approaches knowledge as ultimately explaining the world in which we live and move and are aware. The standards, values, principles, and the like that are the object of knowledge are the standards, values, principles, and the like of this world. Ultimately, then, the non-empiricistic epistemologist addresses questions about the world in which we live,



LAND ETHICS. Coined by the American ecologist Aldo Leopold, the term "land ethics" refers to a *holistic*, rather than an *individualistic*, normative theory. In this sense, land ethics is a departure from twenty-five hundred years of Western moral philosophy. Entire ecological systems, Leopold asserted, have moral considerability.

In making this claim, Leopold is widely considered to be the founder of holistic ecosystemic environmental ethics. To this point, Leopold says, ethics has only dealt with relationships between human individuals. What we need now is an ethic dealing with the relationship between humans and biological systems.

"The Land Ethic" is the third and last section of *A Sand County Almanac*, published in 1949, one year after Leopold's accidental death. Evoking Homer, Leopold recounts Odysseus' lynching of twelve slave girls whose ignominy was sneaking off with Penelope's suitors late at night. His point in citing *The Odyssey* is not to appall us with the young women's horrible death, but to point out that in antiquity the hanging was perfectly acceptable. It is not that the ancient Greeks were amoral; moral considerability at that time did not extend to slaves. Their place in the moral order was below Odysseus and the gods. "Concepts of right and wrong were not lacking from Odysseus' Greece: witness the fidelity of his wife through the long years before at last his black-prowed galleys clove the wine-dark seas for home. The ethical structure of that day covered wives, but had not yet been extended to human chattels," Leopold writes. As private property, they had no intrinsic worth of their own but only extrinsic value for Odysseus. Killing them for disrespecting the moral order of the cosmos was not merely acceptable, it was even laudable.

During the history of the Western tradition, moral considerability has expanded to include individuals of previously excluded groups, for example, blacks and women. "During the three thousand years which have since elapsed, ethical criteria have been extended to many fields of conduct, with corresponding shrinkages in those judged by expediency only." As the domain of moral

considerability has expanded to include more human individuals, Leopold argues, it should be further expanded to include the land (that is, biotic communities). As biota, human beings are not merely members of human communities but also of biotic communities. This expansion of moral considerability fundamentally changes the relationship of humans to the land: "a land ethic changes the role of *Homo sapiens* from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it." The land is not simply something to conquer, to tame, to order.

The major obstacle of achieving a land ethic is the economic worldview.

Currently our relations with the land are guided only by human economic interest. The problem with the economic value-system is that it is incapable of recognizing non-economic (namely, ecological) types of value: "a system of conservation based solely on economic self-interest is hopelessly lopsided. It tends to ignore, and thus eventually to eliminate, many elements in the land community that lack commercial value, but that are (as far as we know) essential to its healthy functioning." Leopold argues that this schism between economic and ecological paradigms is noticeable throughout the disciplines that deal with the land—forestry, wildlife biology, and agriculture. On the economic model, the value of the land is its resource, or instrumental, value. As outlined by English philosopher John Locke in his theory of the creation of private property, nature itself has no inherent value; human beings, through labor, can transform the latent resource value of land into useful products. Humans should "release" as much value from the land as possible through development. On the ecological model, the land is a living thing with value above and beyond economic value. In a word, the land has intrinsic (what Leopold calls "philosophical") value. Thus, the triumph of achieving an ethical relationship with the land requires the recognition of its intrinsic worth.

All poignant and powerful ethical theories are reducible to one memorable maxim (Aristotle's Golden Mean, Christianity's Golden Rule, Mill's Principle of

Utility, Kant's Categorical Imperative). Leopold provides a similar summarization of the Land Ethic: "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise."

It may seem strange that a revolution in ethics would have been instigated by a life scientist rather than a philosopher. On the other hand, perhaps Leopold's lack of rigorous schooling in Western moral theory afforded an uninhibited perspective. A regrettable feature of education is that it may constrain, rather than facilitate, innovation.

American philosopher J. Baird Callicott has fleshed out the nuances of Leopold's insights in greater detail than any other scholar. Callicott argues that the entire enterprise of mainstream Occidental moral philosophy, which has been based on the individual, must be abandoned. Peter Singer's ethic of Animal Liberation and Tom Regan's ethic of Animal Rights are extensions of traditional moral philosophy in that they simply shift the loci of moral considerability from human individuals to select non-human animals.

In contrast, the land ethic shifts the loci of moral considerability from individual organisms to ecosystemic wholes. Individual organisms should not be thought of as having intrinsic value or rights. Individuals, taken in themselves, do not really impact ecosystems. What impact ecosystems are species. An organism has value only insofar as it contributes to the overall integrity and stability of the larger biotic community in which it lives by virtue of being a member of a certain species, and this value differs. The upshot is that the "land ethic manifestly does not accord equal moral worth to each and every member of the biotic community."

On the basis of its thoroughgoing ontological and normative holism, land ethics has been criticized for potentially entailing an "ecological fascism" because individual organisms—including humans who are, according to Leopold, also but plain members and citizens of the biotic community—should be forsaken for the good of ecosystemic wholes. Callicott has rejoined by contending that the land ethic is generated by our membership in biotic communities, but also that our duties as biotic citizens do not necessarily override concomitant commitments to fellow human beings. Communities are nested, like Russian matryoshka dolls, and moral obligations to narrower human communities may take precedence over obligations to wider biotic communities. Certainly, the land ethic does not mandate genocide in light of the ecological distress caused by human overpopulation. Therefore, according to Callicott, the axiology of land ethics is *nonegalitarian holism*. The center of value is the organic whole; individuals have no value in and of themselves independent of the biocommunity. "An environmental ethic, which takes as its *summum bonum* the

integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community, is not conferring moral standing on something *else* besides plants, animals, soils, and waters. Rather, the former, the good of the community as a whole, serves as a standard for the assessment of the relative value and relative ordering of its constitutive parts."

Even though the biotic community is the locus of value, this does not mean that ecosystems are intrinsically valuable on Callicott's account. "In and of itself an infant child is as value-neutral as a stone or a hydrogen atom." There is no such thing as "intrinsic" value existing independently of valuing subjects. Rejecting axiological realism, Callicott holds that the source of all value is consciousness.

Although the source of all value is consciousness, not all of the value conferred by humans is instrumental. Enlisting David Hume, Callicott argues that we value some things for themselves above and beyond mere utility. Consider the way parents value their newborn baby. Part of an infant's value is instrumental, for example, the happiness and joy it brings them. "But it 'has'—that is, there is conferred or projected upon it, by those who value it for its own sake—*something more* than instrumental value, since it is valued for itself as well as for the joy or other utility it affords them." Similarly, people own pets for a variety of egoistic reasons: companionship, protection, and so on. Yet by also cherishing their pet's unique personality, pet owners value it for itself, for being the subject of its own life. This kind of valuing is non-instrumental, though it does not necessarily ascribe intrinsic value either. To denote this type of non-instrumental/non-intrinsic valuation, Callicott suggests we might say that some things are *inherently* valuable. "In the process, the concept of intrinsic value is transformed, or more precisely, truncated."

But *why* do we value some things non-instrumentally? Why aren't we pure egoists? Callicott again gives Hume's answer: sentiments of benevolence and sympathy are part of our constitution (in contemporary terminology, our genetic code). Callicott draws attention to Charles Darwin's extended Humean account in *The Descent of Man*, where Darwin argues that the phenomenon of morality can be explained in terms of natural selection. For Darwin, all animals "which defend themselves or attack their enemies in concert, must indeed be in some degree faithful to one another[.] With those animals which were benefited by living in close association, the individuals which took the greatest pleasure in society would best escape various dangers, whilst those that cared least for their comrades, and lived solitary, would perish in greater numbers." For social animals some kind of sympathetic instinct is essential. Individuals who lack this instinct die off without reproducing at rates higher than their sociable counterparts. In humans this proclivity to live together manifests itself in "sympathy" nor

"beneficence" or "altruism." Furthermore, selection operates at the level of whole communities: as it does for individuals: "In however complex a manner this feeling may have originated, as it is one of high importance to all those animals which aid and defend one another, it will have been increased through natural selection; for those communities, which include the greatest number of the most sympathetic members, would flourish best, and rear the greatest number of offspring." Moral behavior is animal instinct.

Callicott traces this biosocial moral theory from Adam Smith and Hume through Darwin to Leopold and contemporary sociobiology in order to elaborate his own theory of *bioempathy*. To be bioempathetic—to value non-humans for their inherent worth—ultimately boils down to enlightened self-interest. Our ability to value non-human species beyond our short-term instrumental needs enhances our own species' chance for survival. Adopting an ethic of the environment is prudential.

Feeling bioempathy and understanding life science are connected. Although action springs from sentiment rather than reason, as Hume pointed out, reason can help achieve what we desire. Knowledge of ecology can help us achieve one thing we desire—to survive. Because ecological science has taught us that the limits of the human community is not civilization but the biosphere at large, ecology is the wake-up call for bioempathy. This is the reason Callicott speaks of the need for ecological education: "the key to the emergence of a land ethic is, simply, universal ecological literacy."

Ecological literacy and bioempathy are the twin pillars of Callicott's land ethic:

(i) Science has now discovered that the natural environment is a community or society to which we belong, no less than to the human global village. (Ecological literacy)

(ii) We all generally have a positive attitude toward the community or society to which we belong. (Bioempathy)

(iii) We ought to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. (The Land Ethic)

Since having a positive attitude toward life and survival is part of our very make-up, there is no is/ought or fact/value gap; (ii) bridges (iii) with (i). Descriptions of life and health directly imply prescriptions. What ought to be affirmed—the integrity, stability, and beauty of biotic communities—flows directly from descriptions of healthy ecosystemic function.

To summarize, environmental ethics for Callicott is the activity of bioempathetically-motivated and ecologically-enlightened persons making differential valuations of populations of species with regard to overall ecosystemic health and adjudicating conflicting interests of individual organisms accordingly. The interests of organisms of species with ecological value trump the interests

of species of organisms with ecological disvalue.

Land ethics is the happy union of ecology and ethics. It took Leopold's germ of insight and over three decades of indefatigable work by Callicott to flesh out the nuances of holistic, nonegalitarian moral theory. While a rigorous schooling in academic ethics might have discouraged Leopold from his holistic insight, as a philosopher Callicott has been able to work out the details of land ethics that likely would have eluded Leopold.

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LIBERALISM IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA. For nearly half a century, the term liberalism almost disappeared in China's political lexicon, only mentioned when it was criticized as a bourgeois ideology or symbol of egoism. However, things are different now as there has been a revival of liberal political philosophy at the turn of the century. It echoes the situation a century ago when Western liberalism first came to China.

The Revival of Liberalism

In the mid-1990s, a group of scholars held a conference entitled "Cultural China: Thoughts and Trends in Transition" at Princeton University in the U.S.A. The debate was soon echoed in China: a group of professors and researchers with liberal viewpoints appealed to the new liberalism clearly and stoutly. One major symbol of the revival was the publication of a series of articles in memory of Isaiah Berlin who had just passed away, in a most popular liberal newspaper in Canton called *South Daily News Weekend*. The tone of those articles was to positively evaluate the significance of Berlin's liberalism to China's reality and future. And three dead Chinese scholars (economist Gu Zhun, historian Chen Yinke and free writer Wang Xiaobo who had just died) were also commemorated for their liberal ideas.

One prominent figure of the new liberalism is Prof. Li Shenzhi, who was late Premier Chou Enlai's diplomatic secretary and head of the Institute of American Studies in Beijing. He was seriously attacked by Mao's anti-rightist movement in 1957 and resumed his academic position 24 years later. As a senior scholar with liberal thinking, Li writes intensively to advocate and expound liberalism, including some famous prefaces to books recalling those

The intensity of weathering can change to the most extent due to the change of biocenoses on the soil. The global climate changes affect both the composition of the Earth flora and the microbiological activity of the soil. These changes are complex in nature and some further studies on this subject are necessary. On the one hand, the increase of temperature should lead to increasing biological activity and, consequently, to intensified weathering. On the other hand, climate warming can lead to the coniferous forests being replaced by mixed and deciduous ones, which produce fewer acids, and the weathering could be diminished.

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WESTERN ENVIRONMENTALISM. Environmentalism is a critique of Modernity. At the core of Modernity are the ideas of a fundamental ontological divide between humans and non-human nature (metaphysical dualism); on this view non-human nature operates according to the deterministic laws of physics (mechanistic materialism) and non-human nature has no value above and beyond use-value for humankind (anthropocentrism).

Over the history of Western (Occidental) civilization, the instrumentalization of nature and simultaneous human-centeredness has resulted in wide-spread pollution, species extinction, and general environmental degradation. In the words of one concerned critic, "the continuation of modernity threatens the very survival of life on our planet." If features of the Modern Western worldview have precipitated an environmental crisis, certainly the roots extend well beyond Modernity to earlier sources. Some historians have blamed Christianity for bearing "a huge burden of guilt" for the current environmental malaise. Others speculate that the roots of nature's subjugation manifested so outwardly in recent history can be traced back to the prehistoric transition from hunting and gathering to agriculture. But one thing is clear: in Modernism, anthropocentrism reached new heights.

Modern philosophers, scientists, and theologians articulated a similar vision: the universe is a superlatively exquisite machine, the handiwork of God. Nature can be likened to an immense machine, created by God and designed to operate according to the laws of physics. All natural motions—including life—can be explained in terms of material and efficient causation without needing to refer to formal or final causes. Ultimate causes refer to God, and God is outside nature. Thus the undergirding of the Modern view of nature is mechanistic materialism, which Francis Bacon (1561–1626), Galileo Galilei (1564–1642), William Harvey (1578–1657), Thomas

Hobbes (1588–1679), René Descartes (1596–1650), Isaac Newton (1642–1727) and others advocated. Johannes Kepler (1571–1630) also embraced metaphysics of mechanism: "I am much occupied with the investigation of physical causes. My aim is to show that the celestial machine is to be likened not to a divine organism but rather to a clockwork." The Modern view of nature conveniently bifurcates the subject-matter of science and religion: the domain of science is the efficient causation of material substance; the domain of religion is the ultimate purpose of a transcendent God. Science investigates the predictable and clockwork-like operations of nature, without having to infringe on theology's search for why there is any purposiveness in nature at all.

Another central tenet of Occidental Modernism is that mind and matter are metaphysically discrete substances. It is mind or rationality that sharply distinguishes humans from the rest of nature. Free will is a property of rationality and enables humans to escape the inexorability of causal determinism. And the ability to guide one's own actions gives each rational being purpose for oneself, i.e., intrinsic value. Non-human animals and other biota do not have any intrinsic purpose or value. Organisms are biological machines, albeit amazingly complex machines (or in more contemporary language, physico-chemical systems). Machines do not have any purpose (hence value) of their own; the purpose and value of a machine is always extrinsic to the machine. The source of purposiveness of natural processes, such as growth and reproduction, is not inherent to organisms themselves. If there is any teleology in nature, it is there by design, embedded by an external source.

In summary, Modernism holds that nature is material and operates mechanistically according to strict causal laws; all natural phenomena can be described in terms of inert matter in motion; nature is devoid of any intrinsic value or purpose. As rational beings, humans have intrinsic value and, in this sense, are apart or separate from the rest of natural flux. The practical outcome of Modernism has been the instrumentalization of nature. *Qua* machines, the only value non-human fauna, flora, fungi, and inanimate matter have is use-value for humans. Nature has only instrumental value.

As the English philosopher John Locke argued, nature itself has no inherent value, but human beings, through labor, can transform the latent extrinsic (or resource value) of land into useful products. The more natural resources are used by humans, the more value nature has. Therefore the Modern attitude toward nature is one of "exploitationism."

Notwithstanding the shared critique of Modernity, environmental thinking as it developed over the course of the 20th century in the United States is significantly different from non-American environmentalism; particularly European environmentalism. Given the influence of

Karl Marx and the Frankfurt School Critical Theory, European environmentalism has been based in a social and political critique of class hierarchy inherent to Capitalism, and the implications of these hierarchies for the human domination of non-human nature. American environmentalism, on the other hand, has been based in the ideals of the conservation movement and wilderness preservation. These distinctions, of course, are not absolute; fortunately, mainstream American environmentalism over the last decade of the 20th century has widened its previously narrow focus on wilderness.

To discern American environmentalism's unique shade of green vis-à-vis European environmentalism, a brief characterization of the latter is helpful. The degree to which Marx laid the foundation for an ecological consciousness is hotly debated. As a metaphysical materialist, Marx repudiated the dualism of Modernity by emphasizing the human interconnectedness with non-human nature. In *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx wrote: "Nature is man's inorganic body—nature, that is, insofar as it is not itself the human body. Man lives on nature—means that nature is his body, with which he must remain in continuous interchange if he is not to die." In *Capital*, Marx pointed to the waste and exploitation of natural resources in both logging (Volume 2) and agricultural practices (Volume 3). Yet as an Enlightenment thinker, Marx was thoroughly anthropocentric and would likely reject the notion that non-human nature has any value independent of human economic activity.

Whatever the case may be, Marxian thought has profoundly influenced 20th-century European environmentalism. The fundamental premise of the German Green Party, for instance, is that in order to solve environmental problems, social organization must change. Both social and environmental problems result from unjust hierarchies of domination; attaining a more just ecological relationship with non-human nature entails securing just political structures.

American environmentalism has a totally different genealogy. With its emphasis on wilderness preservation and natural resource conservation, no Marxian critique of class hierarchy has been involved. Henry David Thoreau articulated a preservation ethic as early as 1851 when he wrote: "In Wildness is the preservation of the World... Hope and the future for me are not in lawns and cultivated fields, not in town and cities, but in the impervious and quaking swamps[.] My spirits infallibly rise in proportion to the outward dreariness. Give me the ocean, the desert, or the wilderness!... A town is saved, not more by the righteous men in it than by the woods and swamps that surround it."

Thoreau adumbrates the psychological necessity of wildness—of wilderness—in American environmental thinking. In the early 20th century, John Muir, the

founder of the Sierra Club, argued that we need unspoiled wilderness as a sanctuary from the neuroses of modern industrial civilization: "The tendency nowadays to wander in wilderness is delightful to see. Thousands of tired, nerve-shaken, over-civilized people are beginning to find out that going to the mountains is going home[.]" As a pantheist, Muir saw God suffused throughout nature, and destroying wilderness was nothing short of sacrilegious. Lamenting the flooding of Hetch Hetchy Valley in Yosemite, Muir wrote: "These temple destroyers, devotees of ravaging commercialism, seem to have a perfect contempt for Nature, and, instead of lifting their eyes to the God of the mountains, lift them to the Almighty Dollar."

In the same vein, Robert Marshall, founder of the Wilderness Society, argued that wilderness is a *sine qua non* for mental health: "In a civilization which requires most lives to be passed amid inordinate dissonance, pressure and intrusion, the chance of retiring now and then to the quietude and privacy of sylvan haunts becomes for some people a psychic necessity. It is only the possibility of convalescing in the wildness which saves them from being destroyed by the terrible neural tension of modern existence." Writer Wallace Stegner saw the need in preserving wilderness as equal with preserving the American national identity. As he put it, "Something will have gone out of us as a people if we ever let the remaining wilderness be destroyed[.]"

Not all American environmentalists, however, have been as absolutist about preserving wilderness as Muir, Marshall, and Stegner. Many, like Gifford Pinchot (head of the U.S. Forest Service under President Theodore Roosevelt), have argued that natural resources should not be placed off limits to economic development but ought to be used wisely. The conservation movement, he said, is compatible with economic development. "Conservation does mean provision for the future, but it means also and first of all the recognition of the right of the present generation to the fullest necessary use of all the resources with which this country is so abundantly blessed. Conservation demands the welfare of this generation first, and afterward the welfare of the generations to follow." Since this approach aims at making Capitalism sustainable, rather than abandoning it in favor of Socialism, it has been accurately called "neo-liberal environmentalism." Biological systems, on this view, should not be used faster than they can replenish their "ecological capital." The tone of contemporary environmentalism has largely been set by Aldo Leopold and Rachel Carson. Both excoriated the idea that *Homo sapiens* is separate and superior, and painted a picture of the fundamental ontological interconnectedness of all things. In 1949, Leopold announced that first and foremost we are "biotic citizens" of the "land community," and in 1961 Carson

decried the arrogance of thinking that humans can manipulate and control nature. Before Leopold and Carson, the only critics of extreme anthropocentrism were a smattering of Romantics and other fringe characters.

But in the 19th century, Thoreau and Muir were figuratively and literally—voices in the wilderness. Until recently, the Modern view of humans and nature reigned dominant. Now, at the end of the 20th century, critics of extreme humanism and nature-as-a-machine populate the ranks of the environmental movement. Probably every budding environmentalist has felt a certain loathing for human arrogance, stupidity, and myopia of nature's full value. However, the degree of reaction against anthropocentrism within environmentalism varies drastically and is the source of fundamental disagreements.

It may be surprising that homocentrism is not every environmentalist's anathema. For example, Holmes Rolston 3rd maintains that a toned-down humanism (which grants limited intrinsic value to non-human biota) is the solution to the excesses of Modernism. More often environmentalists adopt a non-anthropocentric stance. Deep ecologists, land ethicists, animal liberationists, and neo-Kantian biocentrists fall into this category. In other instances the negative reaction to extreme humanism is itself extreme. Edward Abbey, a veritable hero in some circles, said: "I prefer not to kill animals. I'm a humanist; I'd rather kill a man than a snake." Though Abbey is never to be taken at face value, he speaks for an anti-humanist undercurrent that pervades some parts of the environmental movement. Despite being a work of fiction, Abbey's novel *The Monkey Wrench Gang* precipitated the formation of Earth First!, an environmental group that has engaged in "direct action" aimed at staving off the incessant steamroller of resource development. As Abbey put it, "The idea of wilderness needs no defense, only more defenders." The end—preserving wilderness—justifies the means—ecological sabotage or "ecotage." Direct action affirms the intrinsic value of non-human nature and hence indirectly renounces the radical anthropocentrism of Modernity.

Thoroughgoing anthropocentrism and exploitationism are not without their defenders. In direct opposition to the whole project of environmentalism, economist William Baxter reaffirms the idea that the only value nature has springs from human preference. The economist Julian Simon argues that there is no such thing as overpopulation or exhaustible natural resources—in other words, there is no global ecological malaise. The populist Wise-Use movement also espouses a doctrine of radical anthropocentrism and exploitationism. Ecologist Aldo Leopold disagreed with Pinchot that the land has merely economic or resource value. Ecological systems, rather, have non-instrumental or "intrinsic" value. In the classic work *A Sand County*

Almanac, Leopold observed that "Conservationists are notorious for their dissensions. Superficially these seem to add up to mere confusion, but a more careful scrutiny reveals a single plane of cleavage common to many specialized fields. In each field one group (A) regards the land as soil, and its function as commodity-production; another group (B) regards the land as a biota, and its function as something broader." Against the optimism of the mechanistic materialists biologist Rachel Carson echoed Leopold's skepticism that ecological systems can be manipulated and managed to meet human economic needs. In her seminal book *Silent Spring*, Carson warned: "The 'control of nature' is a phrase conceived in arrogance, born of the Neanderthal age of biology of philosophy, when it was supposed that nature exists for the convenience of man."

In all of these authors, we see a common emphasis on maintaining the integrity and stability of ecological systems, and none of the European emphasis on the need to substantially revamp existing social and political structures. During the 1990s, however, American environmentalism widened its scope. In that decade, historian William Cronon notoriously claimed that wilderness in fact is no more than a human social construction: "Far from being the one place on earth that stands apart from humanity, it is quite profoundly a human creation." Others have criticized mainstream environmental groups as being primarily lobby groups aimed at ensuring outdoor playgrounds for physically fit middle-class whites. Partly in response to these criticisms, there has been a growing awareness of the reality of environmental racism—that is, the inequitable distribution of industry, toxic waste sites, and pollution in lower income neighborhoods (see *Environmental Racism*).

Although American and European thinking about the human place in the biosphere is characterized by distinctly different genealogies and philosophical focus, there has been a growing European-like awareness in the United States on the social and political elements of environmental problems. Interestingly, however, this growing awareness finds its inspiration not in a Marxian critique of the hierarchies of domination inherent to Capitalism, but in the Civil Rights Movement. Thus, whereas European environmentalists seek to assuage ecological problems by tempering Capitalist economics with Socialist remedies, American environmentalists tend to iterate and reiterate each individual's right to a healthy habitat.

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Dr. R. Keller

WESTERN VALUES. There is no single set of "Western values," certainly not a uniformly accepted one. The term has only become popular in the last several decades for identifying the informal institutions accepted by most countries in Western Europe, much of North America, Australia, New Zealand, and, to some degree, in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. "Human rights," of course, probably enjoy the broadest consensus as being core Western values. Freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and private property are also generally included. Differences arise, however, when economic welfare is included as a state duty as opposed to the individual's responsibility.

The "Rights of Man," promulgated during the French Revolution, and "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," founded in the American Declaration of Independence, are classic expressions of Western values. Although they overlap considerably, European and American governments differ in how they put them into practice. Differences also arise over whether or not cultural tastes in music, literature, and art genres are to be included. Non-European ethnic minorities in the United States sometimes reject cultural tastes and styles traceable to Europe with its Greco-Roman heritage, insisting that Western values include "diversity," that is, acceptance of all cultures in the world as equal. Their critics vigorously dispute that claim, insisting that European culture is an undeniable part of Western values and arguing that cultures as "equal" make no sense without explicit measures of equality. Yet as American black economist and historian, Thomas Sowell, points out, European culture is actually a mix of things taken from many cultures. Arabic numbers come from the Middle East. So does the monotheistic religion, Christianity. The Germanic and Celtic tribes of northern Europe bequeathed many pagan traditions to modern European culture. Sowell argues that European values, therefore, are a selection of values from several cultures, a weeding out, taking the best and dropping the rest.

One might conclude, therefore, that there is no such thing as "Western values." Instead, there is just a heterogeneous collection of values from several places, including the West. While this is true, there is a common foundation in the West that has helped determine its mix of values.

Samuel Huntington, the author of *The Clash of Civilizations*, said, "the essence of Western culture is the *Magna Carta*, not the *Magna Mac*." Nor, he added, is it teenage clothing fashions or fizzy drinks. Rather, contemporary Western culture derives from a political idea embodied in the *Magna Carta* of 1215, when English nobles forced King John to sign a charter, agreeing that they had rights, which no king could violate. Human rights, civil society, political pluralism, social and economic justice, and certain forms of art, literature, and music, things said to be Western values, would be inconceivable today without the political idea expressed in the *Magna Carta* that rulers are limited and that individuals have inalienable rights. One can argue that Prince Kurbsky expressed the same idea in his correspondence with Ivan IV in the 1500s when he complained to the tsar that he had violated inherent rights of his boyars, causing Kurbsky to flee to Lithuania. Ivan, of course, rejected that charge, insisting that he was answerable only to God. Although this idea, of course, would resurface in Russia in the early 19th century with the Decembrists and again at the beginning of the 20th century with the creation of the State Duma, it never took hold in Russian political institutions.

The English King John was no more enthusiastic about this political theory than Ivan IV. John renounced the *Magna Carta* as soon as he could secure the Catholic Church's release from his oath before God, a few months later in the summer of 1215. No English king for the next 474 years would agree to a "limited" monarchy based on the *Magna Carta* although its principle was frequently invoked. Not until 1689, when King William of Orange, with his English wife, Mary, came from Holland and accepted the English crown on explicit conditions was the monarchy put on a constitutional basis. William agreed that only the English parliament, not the king, could levy taxes, that the king could not arbitrarily reallocate property rights, and that the king could not arbitrarily remove judges.

Thereafter, the basic principle of the *Magna Carta* took lasting root in England. It had already taken informal shape in Holland. English migrations also carried it to North America, Australia, and elsewhere. It gained ground on the European continent more slowly, in France and Germany during the 19th century, spreading to Scandinavia at the turn of the 20th century. The Counterreformation of the Catholic Church obstructed its early spread into Central and Southern Europe; thus it came to the Iberian Peninsula and Italy only in the second half of the 20th century. Wherever constitutional government has taken strong root, Western moral, social, and intellectual values have also flourished.

A theological basis for limited constitutional government arose from the Protestant Reformation. Both Luther and Calvin defined a relationship between God and individuals that neither established churches nor